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Myopic loss aversion has been used to explain why a high equity premium might be consistent
with plausible levels of risk aversion. The intuition is that it plays the role of high risk aversion
in portfolio choice. But if so, should these agents not perceive larger gains from international
diversiﬁcation than standard preference agents with realistic levels of risk aversion? They might
not because stock market returns are asymmetrically correlated. We analyze the portfolio
problem of a myopic loss averse investor who has to choose between home and foreign equities
in the presence of asymmetrically correlated returns. Perhaps surprisingly, depending on the
horizon, this investor behaves similarly to one with standard preferences in the context of the
home bias puzzle.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Behavioral explanations, in particular myopic lo s sa v e r s i o n( M L A ) ,h a v eb e e nu s e dt oe x p l a i nw h y
a high equity premium might be consistent with plausible levels of risk aversion [Benartzi and
Thaler (1995), Barberis et al. (2001)]. Loss averse decision makers have preferences over gains and
losses relative to a reference point rather than overall wealth. Typically, the slope of the utility
function over losses is steeper than the slope of the utility function over gains. Nondiﬀerentiability
of the utility function at the reference point is loosely analogous to locally high risk aversion. If, in
addition, investors use short evaluation horizons, they may prefer safer bonds with low returns to
riskier equities with high returns because of possible losses in the short term. Benartzi and Thaler
show that this behavior can account for the equity premium in a one period model while Barberis
et al. (2001) incorporate loss aversion into a general equilibrium pricing model.
Choosing between equities and bonds is just one dimension of the portfolio allocation problem.
However well myopic loss aversion might explain portfolio allocation among equities and bonds, on
ﬁrst pass its plausibility in accounting for the observed allocation between domestic and foreign
equities appears low. The intuition is that in order to account for the equity premium, investors
must have high levels of risk aversion. With such high levels, the gains from diversiﬁcation ought
to be larger. For standard preferences, the gains from greater international portfolio diversiﬁcation
are large (van Wincoop, 1999). For MLA investors, these gains from international diversiﬁcation
should appear to be even larger. One might conjecture that any framework that resolves the equity
premium puzzle would make it harder to explain why there is a home bias in equities. The exact
welfare gains from international diversiﬁcation are debatable, but van Wincoop (1999) reports that
studies using standard preferences and a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion that matches the equity
premium show high unexploited gains from diversiﬁcation.
French and Poterba (1991) present evidence that households in the US, the UK, and Japan
typically hold in excess of 80% of their equity portfolio in domestic equities. Three types of
explanations have been oﬀered: frictions and incomplete markets, behavioral explanations, and
small or no gains from diversiﬁcation. Transaction costs, taxes, and other legal restrictions may
serve as a barrier to international investment. However, a number of authors argue that these
2barriers are unlikely to account for the home equity bias (Tesar and Werner, 1995). Informational
asymmetries may lead investors to invest more locally. Hau (2001) documents the performance
of traders located in Frankfurt and traders located elsewhere on the German Security Exchange.
Others authors suggest that the risk of conﬁscation and the alignment of the incentives of foreign
governments might account for the home bias [see, for example, Kocherlakota (1996)]. Another
group of explanations for the home bias are based on behavioral biases observed in individual
decision making. Huberman (2001) documents familiarity bias in individual portfolio holdings.
Individuals tend to hold a disproportionately large amount of their telephone company’s equity
and their employer’s equity in their portfolios. The third group of explanations argues that the
gains are small. For example, some ﬁnd that the gains are not statistically distinguishable from
zero (for a survey, see Lewis, 1999).
A desirable property of any potential explanation of either the equity premium puzzle or home
bias in equities is that the resolution of one puzzle should not make the other puzzle more diﬃcult
to explain. Providing an additional explanation for the home bias in equities is not the purpose
of this study. Instead, we would like to determine whether using myopic loss averse preferences as
an explanation of the equity premium does in fact make the home bias puzzle harder to account
for. Transaction costs, information problems, and familiarity bias may adequately account for the
home bias puzzle. Do these explanations face an even larger task in a model with myopic loss averse
investors? This remains an open question.
Taking a diﬀerent approach, a number of others analyze the international portfolio selection
problem in the context of asymmetrically correlated returns [Ang and Bekaert (2002), Das and Up-
pal (2004)]. Empirical work has shown that correlations between domestic and foreign equities tend
to be higher when the markets are falling and tend to be lower when the markets are rising (Ang
and Bekaert, 2002). In the context of standard preferences, this asymmetry in the correlations
of stock market returns reduces the gain from international diversiﬁcation; however, large gains
still exist (Ang and Bekaert, 2002). For loss averse investors, the interaction of the asymmetric
correlations conditional on up or down movements with the diﬀerences in slope of the loss utility
and gain utility might reduce the gains from diversiﬁcation signiﬁcantly. At a given level of uncon-
ditional correlation between domestic and foreign equity returns, an increase in the asymmetry in
3up correlations and down correlations decreases the perceived gain from diversiﬁcation of portfolio
holdings for risk averse investors. For the loss averse investor, the kink in the utility function might
decrease this perceived gain further. From this argument, if the asymmetry in stock correlations
is large enough, myopic loss averse preferences might be compatible with home bias in equities.
Whether the asymmetry is indeed large enough is an empirical question.
We address this possibility by analyzing loss averse utility under asymmetrically correlated
returns. These results are compared with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility facing
the same environment. We calculate the utility attained from empirical distributions of stock
returns using repeated sampling methods. The gains from diversiﬁcation are quantiﬁed for each
utility speciﬁcation by determining the minimum amount that must be added to the return of the
domestic equity in order to shift the portfolio allocation away from optimal. The relevance of the
asymmetric correlation is explored using simulation of returns under various correlation structures.
The approach of this paper is to solve the portfolio allocation problem of a US investor who must
decide between domestic equity and foreign equity. We take the correlation structure of returns as
g i v e ni nt h i sm o d e l .W eﬁnd that the interaction between asymmetrically correlated returns and
the kink in the loss averse utility function depends on the evaluation horizon.
The next section presents empirical evidence on the correlation structure of stock returns.
Section 3 formally presents the framework of myopic loss aversion to be analyzed. The simulation
and repeated sampling methods are described. Section 4 presents the analysis of myopic loss
aversion utility under asymmetrically correlated asset returns. Section 5 discusses the implications
of the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Some Evidence on Asymmetrically Correlated Returns
Work on ARCH processes (Engle, 1982) has led to the development of a number of tests for
time-varying correlations between international assets. Longin and Solnik (1995) ﬁnd that the
asset returns of seven developed economies do not exhibit constant correlation over the period
1960-1990. They provide evidence that correlation increases in periods of high volatility. Using
as l i g h t l yd i ﬀerent setup, King et al. (1994) develop a model to explain time-varying correlations
4with unobservable factors. Erb et al. (1994) argue that correlations vary with the business cy-
cle. Ang and Bekaert (2002) employ a dynamic international asset allocation model with regime
switching. They ﬁnd that the returns of US, UK, and German equities are more highly correlated
during bear markets. Das and Uppal (2004) model international equity returns as jump-diﬀusion
processes. They suggest that because these jumps tend to occur simultaneously, equity returns are
characterized by systemic risk.
Our focus is not on formal econometric tests of asymmetric correlation in stock market returns.
We provide some evidence that the data we use display the correlation features explained by
the authors mentioned above. Data on the stock market returns of the United States and other
developed countries were obtained from the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) US and
Europe, Australasia, and Far East (EAFE) indices.1 Before tax returns at monthly frequency from
January 1970 to November 2003 were used. As a diagnostic, we regressed US returns on EAFE
returns and EAFE returns on US returns using the following speciﬁcation:
rUS,t = a0 + a1rEAFE,t + εt
rEAFE,t = b0 + b1rUS,t+ νt
We also allowed for diﬀerences in slopes conditional on whether returns were positive or negative.
rUS,t = a0 + a+
1 rEAFE,t1 l{rEAFE,t > 0} + a−
1 rEAFE,t1 l{rEAFE,t ≤ 0} + εt
rEAFE,t = b0 + b+
1 rUS,t1 l{rUS,t > 0} + b−
1 rUS,t1 l{rUS,t ≤ 0} + νt
In both cases, standard F tests reject the null hypothesis that the slopes are equal.
For the US the compounded per annum growth rate is 10.73% with a standard deviation of
0.1575. For EAFE the compounded per annum growth rate is 10.55% with a standard deviation
of 0.1688. Since the standard deviations are roughly equivalent, the asymmetry in the estimates of
conditional β must be mainly due to asymmetric correlation. The unconditional cross-correlation
is 0.5501. The two assets are roughly equivalent and in subsequent analysis, it should not matter
which asset is treated as the home asset. We will use the US asset as the home asset.
1Data are available at http://www.msci.com.
53 Framework and Methodology
We base our simulations on the framework of myopic loss aversion proposed by Benartzi and Thaler
(1995) (henceforth, BT). Agent utility is deﬁn e do v e rg a i n sa n dl o s s e si nt h e i rp o r t f o l i o( r e t u r n s )
relative to some reference point, rather than over terminal wealth. Loss aversion implies that the
utility function representing agent preferences is steeper over losses than over gains, and displays
a kink at zero (the reference point which corresponds to current wealth). The prospective utility
of a given risky outcome is computed as a weighted average of the utility value of each possible
realization. The weights, called decision weights, are nonlinear functions of the whole probability
distribution of payoﬀs which capture some features of procedures that decision makers usually
employ when having to make decisions involving risk. As set forth by BT, myopic behavior means
that agents have an evaluation period at the end of which they review their portfolios and perceive
utility. This diﬀers from the agent’s investment horizon, which in general tends to be much longer.2
More speciﬁcally, we use a functional form, common in the prospect theory literature, originally





xα if x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)β if x<0
where the degree of loss aversion is given by λ ≥ 1,a n dα and β are parameters which provide
some additional ﬂexibility to capture agent behavior towards risk. For example, α , β<1 imply
that agents are risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses.





where πs’s are the decision weights, xs is the net return of the portfolio in state s and S denotes the
set of possible states. For simplicity, these are ordered so that s1 denotes the lowest possible return
2BT argue that due to principal-agent and carrer concerns issues, this tends to be the case even for long-term
institutional investors.
3We formulate the problem in the context of a discrete state space as in BT, but it is straightforward to extend
it to the case of a continuum of states.
6realization. The πs’s are obtained through a nonlinear transformation of the cumulative distribution






r>spr, i.e., the probabilities of obtaining a return at least as high as and strictly higher
than xs, respectively. Then, πs = ω(Ps) − ω(P∗
s ),w h e r eω is a nonlinear transformation which is
(in general) diﬀerent for gains and losses. We adopt the parameterization proposed by Kahneman




qζ(q) +( 1− q)
ζ(q)
´1/ζ(q)
The parameter values we used in the results reported in the next section are λ =2 .25, α =




0.61 if q ≥ 0
0.69 if q<0
. They have been estimated in the context of experiments
designed to study behavior towards risk and were not chosen to inﬂuence the results we obtain in
any particular way.
We solve the portfolio problem by maximizing prospective utility over feasible portfolio weights.5
We look at two diﬀerent environments: one in which the investor faces the empirical distribution of
returns, obtained by sampling repeatedly (with replacement) from the data described in the previous
section; the other in which returns are generated through Monte Carlo simulations, drawing the
logarithmic returns from a joint normal distribution with ﬁrst and second moments which match
the data.6 We also solve the portfolio problem of an investor with CRRA preferences facing the
same environments.
By comparing the results for the myopic loss averse investor with those of the CRRA investor
in these two environments, we are able to isolate the roles of asymmetrically correlated returns and
4The qualitative results are the same if, instead, we set α = β =1(i.e., a piecewise linear value function) and
ζ (q) ≡ 1 (i.e., the actual probabilities rather than the nonlinear decision weights are used). This pattern is also
observed by BT and Barberis et al. (2001).
5We do not allow for short selling and maximize by searching over a portfolio weight grid of increment size 0.01.
6In all simulations, we draw samples of size N = 500,000 and construct the empirical distribution of returns with
histograms (100 bins). Although this is not an estimation exercise, for short we refer to this process of sampling
repeatedly as bootstrapping.
7myopic loss aversion, and to study the interaction between the two.7 More speciﬁcally, we compare
the gains from diversiﬁcation for such investors by asking how much the average compounded annual
return in the home market must increase to make the investor hold a portfolio with a smaller given
fraction of foreign equities instead of the “optimal portfolio.” We refer to this diﬀerence in returns
as the “additional required return” (ARR).8 In particular, in many cases we will be interested in
ﬁnding the ARR which would induce the investor to hold a portfolio displaying the same degree of
“home bias” as we see in the data. We could also calculate an alternative measure of the perceived
gains from international diversiﬁcation, by asking how much the average compounded annual return
in the home market must increase to make the investor indiﬀerent between holding only domestic
stocks and holding the optimal portfolio. The subtle diﬀerence is that in the ﬁrst experiment we
increase the expected return in the home market but still give the investor the opportunity to
diversify, while in the second experiment he must choose between a “home stocks only” portfolio
and the optimal one.
4R e s u l t s
The ﬁrst thing which stands out in the results for MLA investors, is that, contrary to the CRRA
case, the gains from diversiﬁcation measured by ARR do depend on the evaluation horizon. The
fact that they do not for CRRA preferences is just a manifestation of results by Merton (1969)
and Samuelson (1969). For MLA agents, the longer the evaluation horizon, the lower the gains
from international diversiﬁcation. This can be seen by comparing the portfolio choices presented
in Figures 4 and 5: relative to the zero ARR case, the fraction of the portfolio invested in foreign
equities falls when a positive ARR is introduced, and signiﬁcantly more so for longer evaluation
7To be more precise, since we bootstrap from the data, it might be the case that other features of the empirical
distribution are also important for the results. To really isolate the role of the asymmetry we would need a data
generating process which allowed us to change the degree of asymmetry while keeping all other moments and the
shape of the distributions the same.
8In the simulations the ARR is always measured in terms of percentage points added to the compound annual
return.
8horizons.9
We focus most of our analysis on the one year evaluation horizon for two reasons: it is the one
for which MLA behavior has been shown to be able to account for the equity premium puzzle,
and also because it is a realistic evaluation horizon, as argued by BT and Barberis et al. (2001).
Nevertheless, we also emphasize some simulations for diﬀe r e n te v a l u a t i o nh o r i z o n sw h e nt h e yt u r n
out to be helpful in understanding the eﬀects driving the results.
First, we compare the results for an MLA investor with those for a CRRA investor with γ =7 ,
representing a high degree of risk aversion. With zero ARR, the optimal portfolios are quite similar:
for both the bootstrapping and Monte Carlo cases, the optimal portfolios involve roughly a 50-50
split between home and foreign equities (Figures 4 , 6, 7 and 8). This is not surprising, given
the similarities between the two distributions of returns. There is some tilting towards US/home
equities, which reﬂects the slightly better risk-return proﬁle in the sample that we consider (this
moment diﬀerences are also incorporated in the Monte Carlo simulations). Overall, diversiﬁcation
motives seem to drive the portfolio decision. For both preferences, as we increase the ARR, portfolio
weights tilt towards US/home equities. As a result of the horizon eﬀect referred to above, for longer
horizons the shift is relatively bigger for MLA investors (Figures 5 and 9). As Figures 5 and 10
show, for this level of risk aversion the gains from diversiﬁcation appear to be much smaller for
the MLA investor: for the latter, the ARR which supports a portfolio with roughly 10% in foreign
equities is 3%, while for the CRRA investor the ARR which supports such a portfolio is slightly
above 6%.
To assess the role of the asymmetry in the correlation structure, we perform the following
experiment. For MLA preferences, we ﬁnd the ARR which at the one year horizon would yield a
portfolio share of around 10% in foreign equities, under the Monte Carlo simulation. This portfolio
proﬁle is chosen to represent empirically realistic degrees of “home bias”. This results in an ARR
of 3% .T h e c o e ﬃcient of relative risk aversion which, for this ARR, implies the same portfolio
shares for a CRRA investor is γ =3 .35. We refer to this as the “benchmark CRRA investor” case.
9These ﬁgures present the results for the case of bootstrap, but the pattern is the same for the Monte Carlo
simulations. In all cases, the circle over each curve indicates the point at which utility is maximized for that particular
evaluation horizon. Starting from the bottom, the horizons are 2, 3, 4, 6, 12 and 18 months.
9With these parameters, we then compute the optimal portfolios by bootstrapping from the data.
For the benchmark CRRA investor, the eﬀects of the asymmetry in terms of dampening the gains
from diversiﬁcation appear to be small. This ﬁnding is qualitatively similar to the ones found by
Ang and Bekaert (2002) and Das and Uppal (2004), although there is no direct way to make a
quantitative comparison with their results. The reduction in the fraction of the portfolio invested
in foreign equities when the ARR of 3% is introduced is roughly the same under bootstrap and
Monte Carlo simulations: from around 43% to 10% (see Figures 12, 13, 14 and 15). For the MLA
investor, on the other hand, the reduction is larger in the case of the bootstrap, and more so for
shorter evaluation horizons: for 1 year, the reduction is from around 42% to about 11% for Monte
Carlo simulations, and to 8% for bootstrap; for 3 months, for instance, the fraction drops from 42%
to 28% for Monte Carlo results, and from 45% to 23% for bootstrap (Figures 6, 11, 4 and 5).
5 Discussion
The key to understanding the results reported in the previous section is the interaction between
the kink in the MLA utility function and the distribution of returns for any given evaluation
horizon. Given the moments of this distribution, the shorter the horizon the more the returns
are concentrated around the reference point. This contrasts with longer horizons, for which the
distribution shifts more into the domain of gains and at the same time becomes more dispersed. So,
the shorter the horizon, the more important the kink becomes in determining the behavior of the
MLA agent towards risk, relative to the shape of the utility function away from the reference point.
So, the shorter the horizon the more the MLA investor behaves as an extremely risk averse investor.
On the other hand, in the domain of gains and away from the reference point, notice that the MLA
investor tends to behave more like a CRRA investor. In particular, given the estimated parameter
values which we borrowed from the literature, like a CRRA investor with γ =1− 0.88 = 0.12,
which is a very low level of risk aversion.
With this intuition in mind we can account more easily for the behavior described in the previous
section. For shorter evaluation horizons, the eﬀect of the kink is very high, and the investor behaves
like an investor with very high risk aversion. This can be seen in the comparison of the results
10between an MLA investor and a CRRA investor with γ =7 .F o ri n s t a n c e ,w i t hA R R=3%,t h e
MLA investor is almost as reluctant to shift to a portfolio that is more concentrated on US/home
equities as the CRRA agent with γ =7 , for evaluation horizons of up to 4 months. Also, for these
evaluation horizons, the asymmetry in the correlation of returns interacts with the kink around
the reference point to dampen the gains from diversiﬁcation more signiﬁcantly, relative to the
symmetric correlations case. This is because there is also a high asymmetry between gains and
losses. Nevertheless, for short horizons the overall result is that the gains from diversiﬁcation as
we measure them are higher than for a CRRA investor with a realistic degree of risk aversion. The
eﬀect of asymmetrically correlated returns in not enough to counterbalance the fact that the MLA
investor behaves like a very risk averse investor, and therefore we conclude that for these evaluation
horizons, MLA turns out to make the home equity bias more of a puzzle.
The picture changes for longer evaluation horizons. Again, we focus on one year. In this case,
it is much more likely the realized returns in both equity markets will be positive. So, the kink
becomes less important in determining the investors’ attitude towards risk, relative to the shape of
the MLA utility function over gains. Loosely speaking, for the problem we are analyzing, this makes
the investor behave more like an agent with standard preferences and a more reasonable degree of
risk aversion. We motivated this similarity by comparison with the “benchmark CRRA investor.”
For this time horizon, this investor perceives similar gains from diversiﬁcation when returns are
not asymmetrically correlated (Monte Carlo simulations), and the MLA investor perceives slightly
lower gains when returns are asymmetrically correlated. So, for this (and longer) evaluation periods,
models which include MLA investors do not seem to make the home equity bias harder to account
for.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The question driving this paper was whether introducing MLA into a problem of international
portfolio diversiﬁcation would make the home equity bias harder to account for. Although intuition
suggests that this should be the case, we argued that the fact that international equity returns are
asymmetrically correlated could be a reason to expect otherwise.
11We analyzed the portfolio problem of a myopic loss averse investor in the context of asym-
metrically correlated returns. We concluded that, depending on the evaluation horizon, MLA can
perform as well as standard preferences with more realistic degrees of risk aversion when assessed
against the background of the home equity bias puzzle. Put diﬀerently, while falling short of being
an explanation for the puzzle, it does not make it more intriguing.
We intend to check the robustness of our results in a few directions. One is to extend the
portfolio problem to a context of many countries instead of only US and an aggregate of other
developed economies (represented here by EAFE), and a richer set of ﬁxed income, as well as equity
assets. Another is to quantify the gains from diversiﬁcation with additional measures, including
the one described in section 3. Finally, we intend to develop some analytical results to support our
conclusions. While this should be reasonably straightforward in the case of symmetric correlations,
the presence of asymmetrically correlated returns poses more of a challenge. One solution which
appears to be promising is to use the framework proposed by Das and Uppal (2004), who manage
to obtain closed form solutions for the problem of a CRRA investor in a model in which returns
exhibit asymmetric correlations due to simultameous jumps in asset prices.
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Estimating the asymmetric betas for US and EAFE stock returns
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Figure 1: Regression of MSCI EAFE returns on US returns.







































Estimating the asymmetric betas for US and EAFE stock returns
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Figure 2: Regression of MSCI US returns on EAFE returns.
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Figure 3: Loss averse utility functions display a kink at the reference point.






























Percent Invested in EAFE Stock
Effect of Portfolio Composition (US ARR = 0): Bootstrap with Prospective Utility
N = 500000, #bins = 100,  ζ
+ = 0.61, ζ
-  = 0.69, α = 0.88, β = 0.88, λ = 2.25
Figure 4: Myopic loss averse utility with bootstrapped data.


























Percent Invested in EAFE Stock
Effect of Portfolio Composition (US ARR = 0.03): Bootstrap with Prospective Utility
N = 500000, #bins = 100,  ζ
+ = 0.61, ζ
-  = 0.69, α = 0.88, β = 0.88, λ = 2.25
Figure 5: Myopic loss averse utility with bootstrapped data, ARR = 0.03.































Percent Invested in Foreign Stock
Effect of Portfolio Composition (Home ARR = 0): Monte Carlo with Prospective Utility
N = 500000, #bins = 100, µ = (0.10727, 0.10554), σ = (0.15751, 0.16882), ρ = 0.5501, ζ
+ = 0.61, ζ
- = 0.69, α = 0.88, β = 0.88, λ = 2
Figure 6: Myopic loss averse utility with simulated data using sample moments.
























Percent Invested in EAFE Stock
Effect of Portfolio Composition (US ARR = 0): Bootstrap with CRRA Utility ( γ = 7)
N = 500000, #bins = 100
Figure 7: CRRA utility with bootstrapped data.




















Percent Invested in Foreign Stock
Effect of Portfolio Composition (Home ARR = 0): Monte Carlo with CRRA Utility ( γ = 7)
N = 500000, #bins = 100,  µ
1 = 0.10727,  µ
2 = 0.10554,  σ
1 = 0.15751,  σ
2 = 0.16882,  ρ = 0.5501
Figure 8: CRRA utility with simulated data using sample moments.





















Percent Invested in EAFE Stock
Effect of Portfolio Composition (US ARR = 0.03): Bootstrap with CRRA Utility ( γ = 7)
N = 500000, #bins = 100
Figure 9: CRRA utility with γ =7with bootstrapped data, ARR = 0.03.























Percent Invested in EAFE Stock
Effect of Portfolio Composition (US ARR = 0.06): Bootstrap with CRRA Utility ( γ = 7)
N = 500000, #bins = 100
Figure 10: CRRA utility with γ =7with bootstrapped data, ARR = 0.06.


























Percent Invested in Foreign Stock
Effect of Portfolio Composition (Home ARR = 0.03): Monte Carlo with Prospective Utility
N = 500000, #bins = 100,  µ = (0.10727, 0.10554),  σ = (0.15751, 0.16882),  ρ = 0.5501, ζ
+ = 0.61, ζ
- = 0.69, α = 0.88, β = 0.88, λ = 2
Figure 11: Myopic loss averse utility with simulated data using sample moments, ARR = 0.03.




















Percent Invested in Foreign Stock
Effect of Portfolio Composition (Home ARR = 0): Monte Carlo with CRRA Utility ( γ = 3.35)
N = 500000, #bins = 100,  µ
1 = 0.10727,  µ
2 = 0.10554,  σ
1 = 0.15751,  σ
2 = 0.16882,  ρ = 0.5501
Figure 12: CRRA utility using the benchmark value for γ, simulated data using sample moments.





















Percent Invested in Foreign Stock
Effect of Portfolio Composition (Home ARR = 0.03): Monte Carlo with CRRA Utility ( γ = 3.35)
N = 500000, #bins = 100,  µ
1 = 0.10727,  µ
2 = 0.10554,  σ
1 = 0.15751,  σ
2 = 0.16882,  ρ = 0.5501
Figure 13: CRRA utility using the benchmark value for γ, simulated data using sample moments,
ARR = 0.03.




















Percent Invested in EAFE Stock
Effect of Portfolio Composition (US ARR = 0): Bootstrap with CRRA Utility ( γ = 3.35)
N = 500000, #bins = 100
Figure 14: CRRA utility using the benchmark value for γ, bootstrapped data.





















Percent Invested in EAFE Stock
Effect of Portfolio Composition (US ARR = 0.03): Bootstrap with CRRA Utility ( γ = 3.35)
N = 500000, #bins = 100
Figure 15: CRRA utility with benchmark value for γ, bootstrapped data, ARR = 0.03.
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